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CmINAL LAW:

TULSA LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 1, No. 1
RESTRAINT OF THE AccusED DUNG TIAL

It is often necessary for a criminal defendant to be restrained
in some manner during trial. The main danger created by restraining the defendant by such means as shackles, chains, or
armed guards is that prejudice might be formed in the minds
of the jurors upon viewing the accused before them. They might
infer that the defendant, guilty or not of this charge, is obviously bad or he would not be so restrained. The jury might ask,
'Why should we believe the defense of this man who is not
even trusted by the judge and sheriff?" By his appearance, the
defendant may possibly be a silent witness agast himself.
The spirit of the law is that even though a person is accused of a heinous crime, as long as his intent is to properly
defend the charges against him, he will be allowed to do so
unrestrained. Blackstone stated:

~. .. LAJnd it is laid down in our ancient books that, though
under an indictment of the highest nature, he must be brought
to the bar without irons or any manner of shackles or bonds,
unless there be evident danger of an escape, and then he
may be secured with irons."'
Modern practice has been to allow restraint of the accused
in more instances than the "evident danger of an escape" noted
by Blackstone.2 It was ruled in Way v. United States" that a defendant could be restrained to prevent his escape, prevent him
from injuring others, or to maintain a quiet and peaceable trial.
Restraint of the defendant is a matter within the discretion
of the trial court in most jurisdictions. Reversible error will
result only when the trial court clearly abused its discretion, or
when the defendant was actually prejudiced before the jury.4
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals first considered the
problem of restraint in DeWolf v. State. The defendant was held
to 'have been properly shackled during his entire trial for the
murder of a policeman. The appellate court remarked that the
extent of restraint during trial is to be goverened by: (1) The
character of the accused. (2) His disposition toward being a
violent and dangerous person. (3) His record for escapes and
possibilities of attempts to release him from custody. (4) The
possibility his misconduct could obstruct the work of the court.
The court gave support to the view that armed guards, where
feasible, should be resorted to instead of handcuffs and shackles.
In its next session after the DeWolf decision, the Oklahoma
legislature added a clause to the then existing statute on restraint.
14 BLAcxsToNE,

2Ibid.

ComwENTAXUEs *322.

8285 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1960).
4 State v. Brooks, 352 P.2d 611, 613 (Hawaii 1960).
5 95 Okla.Cr. 287, 245 P.2d 107 (1952).
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The statute previously read: "... ENlor can a person charged
with a public offense be subjected before conviction to any more
restraint than is necessary for his detention to answer the charge."6
The following clause vas added: ".... and in no event shall he
be tried before a jury while in chains and shackles."r
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, through Judge
Nix, gave bristling support to the new statute in its first court test,
French v. State,8 in which a murder conviction was reversed.
The accused had appeared before the jury handcuffed, his arms
shackled to a six-inch leather belt around his body, and with
three armed guards accompanying him. Judge Nix colorfully
condemned the restraint of the defendant by stating:
"Though biologically speaking, man may be an animal, it
was never intended that he be treated as such in the realm
of criminal jurisprudence. If we permitted the subjection of
man to such treatment before the courts of our land, we have
paved the way for him to be tried while tied to a log or in
a steel cage, as well as chains and shackles. Barbarism has
been abandoned and must never be permitted to creep back
through the crevices created by lenient rules of law."9
The French case holds that the "modem reasoning" which
motivated the amended statute is essentially: (1) One charged
with a crime is entitled to appear in court with free use of his
mental and physical facilities. (2) The inherent right, that every
defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty, would be
violated if an accused is shackled or chained. That this is only one
view is indicated by State v. Hashimoto'0 which placed more reliance on the judgment of jurors who witness a handcuffed defendant than the Oklahoma legislature presumably did when it
changed the statute. The court remarked that:
'It is reasonable to assume that a jury panel, particularly
when found acceptable to the parties, as it was the case here,
is composed of men and women of average intelligence and
circumspection as to their sworn duty as jurors to examine,
in consonance with the court's instructions on the governing
law, the evidence presented and render a fair, unbiased and
impartial verdict. It is a farfetched conjecture that jurors
under oath would spontaneously harbor prejudice immediately upon seeing a defendant brought to court in manacles.""
Because chains and shackles cannot be used by the Oklahoma
62

ORLA. STAT. §

722 OxLA. STAT.

15 (1951).

§ 15 (1961).

8 377 P.2d 501 (Okla.Cr. 1962).
9Id. at 504.
10 377 P.2d 728 (Hawaii 1962).
11Id. at 734.
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courts, the only practical method left to restrain the defendant
is by the use of guards. The close proximity of such guards could
also prejudice a defendant before the jury. The Missouri Supreme
Court considered this type of restraint in State v. Johnstone.12 The
defendant, charged with first degree robbery, made statements
that he intended to create a disturbance during the trial. It was
ruled proper to have two deputies not in uniform who had concealed weapons as a reasonable precaution for maintenance of
order and retention of custody of the defendant. These deputies
were stationed a considerable distance from the counsel table
and appeared to be a part of the courtroom officials. This procedure lessened the opportunity for prejudice to form in the minds
of the jurors.
Since 1871,23 ninety-five appellate opinions have considered
the problem of restraint. Only nine of these cases were reversed on appeal. 14 No federal appellate court has reversed any
lower court's decision, and the United States Supreme Court has
not yet written any decision concerning courtroom restraint.
An appellate court should be informed why the trial court
allowed the restraint of the accused. Such reasons do not usudlly
appear in the record because judges have seldom explained their
rulings to the jury. A hearing should be granted to afford the defendant an opportunity to rebut any allegations of necessity for
restraint. This should be done out of the presence of the jury so
as to not further prejudice the accused. The most desirable method is to hold a hearing prior to the trial by jury. The only case
in which this practice is reported to have been followed is People
v. Bryant.'5 Bryant was a jail escapist who was confronted with
several felony charges. Upon request of the district attorney,
the trial court conducted a hearing in the nature of a trial without
a jury to determine if the restraint was necessary. The witnesses
were cross-examined by the defense which was given an opportunity to introduce evidence. It was concluded that the proof
submitted and testimony given clearly indicated that there were
imperative reasons for the handcuffing. The appellate court commented that it is of paramount importance that the trial court
state its reasons for its action in allowing such restraint.
12335 S.W.2d 199 (Mo.), cert. denied 364 U.S. 842, 81 Sup.Ct. 81,
5 L.Ed.2d 66 (1960).
13 The first appellate court case in this country involving restraint was
People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165 (1871) in which the defendants were
tried in irons without evident necessity for the crime of robbery.
14
Each of the nine cases that has been reversed on appeal is briefly
summarized here with the exception of the Harrington case found in note
13. Defendant was convicted of simple robbery and was brought into court
handcuffed when it was not necessary. Montoya v. People, 345 P.2d 1062
(Colo. 1959). It was improper to have brought accused charged with breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor into court clothed
as a convict and in chains in the presence of the jury when he had not been
previously convicted of a crime. Shultz v. State, 179 So. 764 (Fla. 1938).
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The procedure followed in the Bryant case could be adopted
in any jurisdiction without the necessity of statutory change. All

that is necessary is that counsel for either the defense or the

prosecution request the hearing, and that the trial court grant

such a hearing in exercising its sound judicial discretion. The

courts should not be hesitant in granting such a hearing unless
it is obviously a delaying tactic. Of course, there is no need for
such a hearing in Oklahoma unless it is attempted to unduly
restrain the defendant by other means than chains or shackles.
The appellate courts frequently resort to the practice of
holding that they will not infer prejudice in restraint cases unless
the prejudice is sustained by circumstances in the record. This
presents the defendant with a seemingly insurmountable hurdle
because he has no way of actually proving that the jurors formed
prejudices. Counsel cannot dissect the mind of a juror and include
its contents in his appeal brief. Usually, the only apparent course
open to him is to object to the restraint, and 'hope for a sympathetic hearing on appeal. This seldom happens. Although the
hearing would demonstrate abuse of discretion, it lends nothing
to a determination of the effect of restraint on the jury. It is
submitted that the "effect on the jury" test is unrealistic, unworkable, and should be abandoned. The state of mind of each
juror cannot possibly be perceived through the mere printed word
of the transcript or appeal brief.
Without a hearing, it is possible that the most harmless
Defendant's rape conviction was improper because two of his witnesses,
who had been brought from the state prison, were manacled during trial.
State v. Coursolle, 97 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1959). The Missouri Supreme
Court first announced the rule that there must be some reason based on
the conduct of the prisoner at the time of the trial to authorize his hands
to be chained in irons. Although the defendant had assaulted a person in
the same courtroom three months previously, his conviction of first degree
murder was reversed because of undue restraint. State v. Kring, 64 Mo. 591
(1877), reed 107 U.S. 221, 2 Sup.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883) only
in reference to an ex post facto law. The rule announced in the Kring case
was applied, and a reversal was granted because the court permitted the
sheriff to keep defendants shackled during the empaneling of the jury. State
v. Rice, 149 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. 1941). Defendant, charged with the crime
of murder, was improperly brought before the jury on two instances handcuffed with his arms shackled to a six-inch leather belt around his body,
and escorted by three armed guards. See note 5 supra. Several errors were
ruled on for reversal in State v. Smith, 8 Pac. 343 (Ore. 1883), one
of which was that defendant was tried with irons on his feet. He had
killed a penitentiary officer. The court noted the Harrington and Kring
decisions. In State v. Williams, 50 Pac. 580 (Wash. 1897), the defendant,
charged with burglary, and his witnesses were both manacled in the
courtroom, and the former at a view of the allegedly burglarized premises.
The court stated that there was no impelling necessity for this restraint
which may have to some extent deprived the prisoner of the free and calm
use of all his faculties.
155 Misc.2d 446, 166 N.Y.Supp.2d 59 (Richmond County Ct. 1957),

aff'd 12 App.Div.2d 654, 210 N.Y.Supp.2d 800 (1960).
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